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31 May 1960

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

DK
USSR: In his speech in Moscow on 28 May, Khrushchev carried forward his effort initiated last week in Berlin to reconcile his arguments for a policy of detente with his performance in Paris. His unusual step in denying Western reports of opposition to him at home and pressure on the USSR from Communist China reflects his effort to portray Soviet actions under his leadership as carefully considered and basically consistent. Although he again expressed hope that a new summit meeting would be held in six to eight months, Khrushchev added that he would not be surprised if this did not happen. He also reverted to an earlier position that Communist China, India, Indonesia, and others should be included in future meetings.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

DK
Turkey: An 18-man cabinet has been announced, and a committee of law professors has been appointed to draft a new constitution and electoral law. Prime Minister Gursel has said he will hold elections as soon as possible but believes he will need from one to three months beforehand to restore the situation to normal. Gursel has told American officers he is firmly resolved to turn power over to the new parliament as soon as it is elected.

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Ethiopia: [Haile Selassie plans for the time being not to accept the Soviet offer of 30 April of military assistance for about 40,000 men,]

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[The Emperor,] is interpreting the forthcoming visit of two high-ranking American military officials as a favorable answer to his 11 May request for more American military equipment.]

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Cameroun: [Foreign Minister Okala recently told the American charge in Yaoundé that] Felix Moundié, exiled terrorist leader, is planning to overthrow the Cameroun Government following expiration of the country's present security agreement with France on 30 June. American and British representatives in Yaoundé consider it "fairly plausible" that Moundié's rebels might make a last-ditch effort. [The Cameroun Government probably hopes this threat, which the Camerounians may be exaggerating, will increase support for President Ahidjo's recent plea for US military aid.]

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III. THE WEST

France: [Despite De Gaulle's solidarity with the United States on East-West issues, he will never be satisfied if consultation among Britain, France, and the United States is limited to the German problem and Western tactics toward the USSR, according to Premier Debré. In particular, he said, De Gaulle wants "real" consultation on African problems with a view to working out a common line and considers cooperation on nuclear weapons an integral part of three-power cooperation.]

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Cuba: The Peiping opera company which has been touring Latin America will spend most of June in Havana. The Cuban Government is emphasizing cultural ties with Communist China and may soon proceed with the long-foreseen establishment of diplomatic relations. A group of students arrives in Peiping from Cuba on 25 May, the latest of numerous Cuban visitors there, and Cuba seems to be a key target of Peiping's stepped-up propaganda activities in Latin America.

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LATE ITEM

OK

***Malinovsky Speech:** The tough speech by Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Malinovsky on 30 May before the Moscow Conference of Communist Labor Shockworkers, to which Khrushchev spoke only two days earlier, was designed to reinforce the general lines of the premier's address and to underscore both the USSR's sensitivity to any future overflights and its military capabilities to prevent them. A TASS summary of his speech included his "warning" that he personally has ordered the commander in chief of the rocket forces to strike at the base from which any future "intruder plane comes." Malinovsky did not attribute this order to a decision of the Soviet Government or party central committee, as is Khrushchev's usual custom, but justified it on the grounds that such a plane might be carrying a hydrogen bomb. He followed Khrushchev's description that "modern war... would be a virtual catastrophe for some countries," but he then nodded in the direction of the more truculent Chinese position on the aggressive intentions of the West by adding, "We do not trust the imperialists," and, "We are convinced they are waiting only for an opportunity to attack... the socialist countries and that they are checked only by fear of the complete rout of imperialism as a system."

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev's Foreign Policy Speech

In his first speech after returning to Moscow, Khrushchev on 28 May elaborated on his statements in East Berlin on the future course of Soviet policy and continued his effort to explain and justify the contradiction between his policy of detente and his performance in Paris. Although he ridiculed President Eisenhower and again attacked the United States on the U-2 incident, Khrushchev apparently is beginning to work back toward his pre-summit position, which drew a distinction between the President and "cold war forces" in the US.

While pointing out the contrast between the President's "good intentions" and US foreign policy, Khrushchev said, "I still believe President Eisenhower himself wants peace." In this manner the Soviet premier is apparently seeking to forestall charges that he was mistaken in his judgment and had allowed himself to be deceived by the President. As part of his effort to justify his course over the past seven months and minimize the effects of the Paris breakdown on Soviet policy, Khrushchev asserted that Soviet policy was "correct and just" and asked, "Why should it be changed?"

Khrushchev's awareness of the contradictions in criticizing US intentions while portraying his past policy as correct is reflected in his sensitivity to Western reports that internal opposition or pressure from Communist China was responsible for his behavior in Paris. He took the unusual step of specifically denying these reports and Western speculation that Mikoyan is in trouble.

Although he again expressed hope that a new summit meeting would take place in six to eight months, Khrushchev added that he would not be surprised if this did not occur. His call for the inclusion of Communist China, India, and Indonesia and other countries in future meetings may be the first step toward freeing his hand should he decide to back off from the commitment he made in his 20 May speech in Berlin to maintain the status quo there until a new summit. He again counseled patience until a new meeting and reaffirmed his intention to strive in the meantime for negotiated settlements of outstanding problems, including the German and Berlin questions.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

New Government Formed in Turkey


A provisional government of 15 civilians and three military cabinet members has been formed in Turkey. Retired General Cemal Gursel, who headed the coup against the former government, is prime minister as well as commander in chief of the armed forces. General officers also head the interior and communications ministries. The cabinet appears to be composed of nonpartisan personalities with a reputation for integrity and ability.

A seven-man committee of law professors from Ankara and Istanbul universities are beginning work on the draft of a new constitution and electoral law which will be reviewed before adoption by a larger committee representing a wide segment of Turkish opinion. One report suggests that a bicameral legislature will replace the present unicameral one and that a court with power to review the constitutionality of all legislation will be formed.

Prime Minister Gursel has told American officers that he will require one to three months to restore the situation to normal before elections, but that he is firmly determined to hand over power to the new parliament as soon as it is elected. Early elections seem mandatory, lest there be consolidation of military control which would then be difficult to give up. While the elections might be free in general, it seems clear that the present government will not permit members of the previous administration to win positions of influence.

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Ethiopia Expects Additional American Military Aid

Emperor Haile Selassie is interpreting the forthcoming visit of two high-ranking American military officials as a favorable answer by the United States to Ethiopia's recent request for additional military assistance,

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As a result, the Emperor planned to call in the official representative of the Soviet Ministry of Trade on 28 May and advise him that Ethiopia would not accept Soviet aid at this time for military and security needs. On 30 April the USSR offered Ethiopia arms and equipment to supply about 40,000 men, but the Emperor has been reluctant to become dependent on Moscow for such equipment.

The Ethiopians, elated over the visit by US military officials, apparently are convinced that the United States will provide arms for at least an additional 8,000 men, although Addis Ababa had requested assistance for the 26,000-man police force as well.

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In view of the Emperor's heightened expectation of additional aid and Ethiopia's growing fears of Somali nationalism, any program not promising more arms aid is likely to be rejected in favor of some of the USSR's preferred assistance.

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Cameroun Government May Face Coup Attempt

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[Foreign Minister Okala has told the American charge in Yaoundé that] the Cameroun Government has documentary evidence that Felix Mounie--exiled extremist leader now residing in Guinea--is planning a coup against the government in July. While the US and British representatives in Yaoundé believe a last-ditch effort by Mounie's rebels is "fairly plausible," it appears doubtful that Mounie can attract sufficient support from among the dissident Bamileke tribal elements to challenge the authority of the local security forces.

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[According to Okala,] the coup will not be launched until after the expiration of Cameroun's present security agreement with France on 30 June in an effort to avoid intervention by French security units stationed there. Mounie, apparently believing the existing agreement with France will not be extended or renegotiated, will seek to exploit what he believes will be a gap in the government's security defenses. The foreign minister, however, has conceded that circumstances may force the negotiation of new agreements with France.

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[Okala added that] Mounie has plans to augment his forces, if necessary, by flying in small bands of armed Chinese Communists from Guinea. However, there is no evidence that there are Chinese guerrillas in Guinea.

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[The foreign minister may be exaggerating the gravity of the situation in an effort to support his country's case in requesting US military aid. President Ahidjo realizes that Cameroun's prosperity is dependent on external assistance, but he also is aware that continued exclusive reliance on French aid makes his government vulnerable to charges of being a French puppet regime. He may believe, therefore, that by obtaining aid from the US or Western European sources other than France, he will be able to refute such charges without endangering present economic programs.]

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III. THE WEST

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De Gaulle Concerned Over Policy Differences With US

[Premier Debré is "still quite grave" concerning French-American relations in Africa and on nuclear questions, according to a State Department official recently visiting Paris. Debré said he was gratified at the progress made in recent talks by Western leaders in Paris on US-British-French co-operation, but he stressed that in order to satisfy De Gaulle, tripartite discussions must have broader scope than Germany and tactics vis-a-vis the USSR.]

[Debré said De Gaulle would not be satisfied until there is "real consultation among the three powers on the substance of African problems with a view to working out a common line." He said De Gaulle is "hurt" by US-French policy divergences, particularly in Morocco, and is "haunted" by the fear that the United States would undertake a policy unfavorable to France in Black Africa.]

[Describing De Gaulle as "profoundly hurt over US non-cooperation" in the nuclear field, Debré cited difficulties arising out of current attempts to amend the French-US bilateral agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and noted that De Gaulle considers cooperation on nuclear weapons an integral part of three-power cooperation.]

[The premier said De Gaulle himself would never ask his allies for anything but was glad to have Debré make his views known. Debré stressed, however, that despite differences of opinion, solidarity with the United States on East-West issues is the most fundamental of De Gaulle's policies.]

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Cuba Increases Ties With Communist China

The Peiping opera company which is touring Latin America will spend most of June in Havana. Its visit will highlight a program which the Castro regime has been planning for several months emphasizing Cuban-Chinese cultural ties. The newly formed Cuban-Chinese Friendship Association, headed by pro-Communist Cubans who have recently visited Peiping, will probably play a prominent role, and the campaign may be a prelude to the expected establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

The New China News Agency--which reports extensively on Cuban affairs and is believed to contribute financially to the Chinese-language Communist newspaper in Cuba and to Castro's Prensa Latina news agency--reported on 26 May that a Cuban student delegation had been welcomed to Peiping the previous day. At least one other student group, a labor delegation, a number of Castro officials, and Cuban Communist leaders have also visited Communist China in recent weeks. Thirty Cuban Communist students are [redacted] attending a six-month training course in China.

Peiping has demonstrated particular sympathy for Castro's revolution, and Cuba seems to be a key target in plans for stepped-up Chinese Communist propaganda activities in Latin America. Peiping has probably been encouraged in its effort by recent signs of increased Cuban willingness to establish diplomatic relations with bloc countries. [redacted]

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